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Abstract. Strongly multiplicative linear secret sharing schemes (LSSS)
have been a powerful tool for constructing secure multi-party computa-
tion protocols. However, it remains open whether or not there exist effi-
cient constructions of strongly multiplicative LSSS from general LSSS. In
this paper, we propose the new concept of a 3-multiplicative LSSS, and
establish its relationship with strongly multiplicative LSSS. More pre-
cisely, we show that any 3-multiplicative LSSS is a strongly multiplicative
LSSS, but the converse is not true; and that any strongly multiplicative
LSSS can be efficiently converted into a 3-multiplicative LSSS. Further-
more, we apply 3-multiplicative LSSS to the computation of unbounded
fan-in multiplication, which reduces its round complexity to four (from
five of the previous protocol based on strongly multiplicative LSSS). We
also give two constructions of 3-multiplicative LSSS from Reed-Muller
codes and algebraic geometric codes. We believe that the construction
and verification of 3-multiplicative LSSS are easier than those of strongly
multiplicative LSSS. This presents a step forward in settling the open
problem of efficient constructions of strongly multiplicative LSSS from
general LSSS.
Keywords monotone span program, secure multi-party computation, strongly
multiplicative linear secret sharing scheme
1 Introduction
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) [16, 9] is a cryptographic primitive that
enables n players to jointly compute an agreed function of their private inputs in
a secure way, guaranteeing the correctness of the outputs as well as the privacy of
the players’ inputs, even when some players are malicious. It has become a funda-
mental tool in cryptography and distributed computation. Linear secret sharing
schemes (LSSS) play an important role in building MPC protocols. Cramer et
al. [6] developed a generic method of constructing MPC protocols from LSSS.
Assuming that the function to be computed is represented as an arithmetic cir-
cuit over a finite field, their protocol ensures that each player share his private
input through an LSSS, and then evaluates the circuit gate by gate. The main
idea of their protocol is to keep the intermediate results secretly shared among
the players with the underlying LSSS. Due to the nature of linearity, secure
additions (and linear operations) can be easily achieved. For instance, if player
Pi holds the share x1i for input x1 and x2i for input x2, he can locally com-
pute x1i + x2i which is actually Pi’s share for x1 + x2. Unfortunately, the above
homomorphic property does not hold for multiplication. In order to securely
compute multiplications, Cramer et al. [6] introduced the concept of multiplica-
tive LSSS, where the product x1x2 can be computed as a linear combination of
the local products of shares, that is, x1x2 =
∑n
i=1 aix1ix2i for some constants
ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since x1ix2i can be locally computed by Pi, the product can
then be securely computed through a linear combination. Furthermore, in order
to resist against an active adversary, they defined strongly multiplicative LSSS,
where x1x2 can be computed as a linear combination of the local products of
shares by all players excluding any corrupted subset. Therefore, multiplicativity
becomes an important property in constructing secure MPC protocols. For ex-
ample, using strongly multiplicative LSSS, we can construct an error-free MPC
protocol secure against an active adversary in the information-theoretic model
[6]. Cramer et al. [7] also gave an efficient reconstruction algorithm for strongly
multiplicative LSSS that recovers the secret even when the shares submitted by
the corrupted players contain errors. This implicit “built-in” verifiability makes
strongly multiplicative LSSS an attractive building block for MPC protocols.
Due to their important role as the building blocks in MPC protocols, efficient
constructions of multiplicative LSSS and strongly multiplicative LSSS have been
studied by several authors in recent years. Cramer et al. [6] developed a generic
method of constructing a multiplicative LSSS from any given LSSS with a double
expansion of the shares. Nikov et al. [14] studied how to securely compute multi-
plications in a dual LSSS, without blowing up the shares. For some specific access
structures there exist very efficient multiplicative LSSS. Shamir’s threshold se-
cret sharing scheme is a well-known example of an ideal (strongly) multiplicative
LSSS. Besides, self-dual codes give rise to ideal multiplicative LSSS [7], and Liu
et al. [12] provided a further class of ideal multiplicative LSSS for graph access
structures. We note that for strongly multiplicative LSSS, the known general
construction is of exponential complexity. Ka¨sper et al. [11] gave some efficient
constructions for specific access structures (hierarchical threshold structures).
It remains open whether there exists an efficient transformation from a general
LSSS to a strongly multiplicative one.
On the other hand, although in a multiplicative LSSS, multiplication can be
converted into a linear combination of inputs from the players, each player has to
reshare the product of his shares, that is, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Pi needs to reshare the
product x1ix2i to securely compute the linear combination
∑n
i=1 aix1ix2i. This
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resharing process involves costly interactions among the players. For example, if
the players are to securely compute multiple multiplications,
∏l
i=1 xi, the simple
sequential multiplication requires interaction of round complexity proportional
to l. Using the technique developed by Bar-Ilan and Beaver [1], Cramer et al.
[4] recently showed that the round complexity can be significantly reduced to a
constant of five for unbounded fan-in multiplications. However, the method does
not seem efficient when l is small. For example, considering x1x2 and x1x2x3,
extra rounds of interactions seem unavoidable for computing x1x2x3 if we apply
the method of Cramer et al. [4].
1.1 Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose the concept of 3-multiplicative LSSS. Roughly speak-
ing, a 3-multiplicative LSSS is a generalization of multiplicative LSSS, where
the product x1x2x3 is a linear combination of the local products of shares. As
one would expect, a 3-multiplicative LSSS achieves better round complexity for
the computation of
∏l
i=1 xi compared to a multiplicative LSSS, if l ≥ 3. Indeed,
it is easy to see that computing the product
∏9
i=1 xi requires two rounds of in-
teraction for a 3-multiplicative LSSS but four rounds for a multiplicative LSSS.
We also extend the concept of a 3-multiplicative LSSS to the more general λ-
multiplicative LSSS, for all integers λ ≥ 3, and show that λ-multiplicative LSSS
reduce the round complexity by a factor of 1log λ from multiplicative LSSS. In
particular, 3-multiplicative LSSS reduce the constant round complexity of com-
puting the unbounded fan-in multiplication from five to four, thus improving a
result of Cramer et al. [4].
More importantly, we show that 3-multiplicative LSSS are closely related
to strongly multiplicative LSSS. The latter is known to be a powerful tool for
constructing secure MPC protocols against active adversaries. More precisely,
we show the following:
(i) 3-multiplicative LSSS are also strongly multiplicative;
(ii) there exists an efficient algorithm that transforms a strongly multiplicative
LSSS into a 3-multiplicative LSSS;
(iii) an example of a strongly multiplicative LSSS that is not 3-multiplicative.
Our results contribute to the study of MPC in the following three aspects:
– The 3-multiplicative LSSS outperform strongly multiplicative LSSS with re-
spect to round complexity in the construction of secure MPC protocols.
– The 3-multiplicative LSSS are easier to construct than strongly multiplica-
tive LSSS. First, the existence of an efficient transformation from a strongly
multiplicative LSSS to a 3-multiplicative LSSS implies that efficiently con-
structing 3-multiplicative LSSS is not a harder problem. Second, verifica-
tion of a strongly multiplicative LSSS requires checking the linear combi-
nations for all possibilities of adversary sets, while the verification of a 3-
multiplicative LSSS requires only one checking. We give two constructions of
LSSS based on Reed-Muller codes and algebraic geometric codes that can be
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easily verified for 3-multiplicativity, but it does not seem easy to give direct
proofs of their strong multiplicativity.
– This work provides two possible directions toward solving the open problem
of determining the existence of efficient constructions for strongly multiplica-
tive LSSS. On the negative side, if we can prove that in the information-
theoretic model and with polynomial size message exchanged, computing
x1x2x3 inevitably needs more rounds of interactions than computing x1x2,
then we can give a negative answer to this open problem. On the positive
side, if we can find an efficient construction for 3-multiplicative LSSS, which
also results in strongly multiplicative LSSS, then we will have an affirmative
answer to this open problem.
1.2 Organization
Section 2 gives notations, definition of multiplicative LSSS, and general construc-
tions for strongly multiplicative LSSS. Section 3 defines 3-multiplicative LSSS.
Section 4 shows the relationship between 3-multiplicative LSSS and strongly mul-
tiplicative LSSS. Section 5 gives two constructions of 3-multiplicative LSSS from
error-correcting codes, and Section 6 discusses the implications of 3-multiplicative
LSSS in MPC. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, let P = {P1, . . . , Pn} denote the set of n players and
let K be a finite field. In a secret sharing scheme, the collection of all subsets of
players that are authorized to recover the secret is called its access structure, and
is denoted AS. An access structure possesses the monotone ascending property:
if A′ ∈ AS, then for all A ⊆ P with A ⊇ A′, we also have A ∈ AS. Similarly, the
collection of subsets of players that are possibly corrupted is called the adversary
structure, and is denoted A. An adversary structure possesses the monotone
descending property: if A′ ∈ A, then for all A ⊆ P with A ⊆ A′, we also have
A ∈ A. Owing to these monotone properties, it is often sufficient to consider the
minimum access structure ASmin and the maximum adversary structure Amax
defined as follows:
ASmin = {A ∈ AS | ∀B ⊆ P, we have B ( A⇒ B 6∈ AS},
Amax = {A ∈ A | ∀B ⊆ P, we have B ) A⇒ B 6∈ A}.
In this paper, we consider the complete situation, that is,A = 2P−AS. Moreover,
an adversary structure A is called Q2 (respectively, Q3) if any two (respectively,
three) sets in A cannot cover the entire player set P . For simplicity, when an
adversary structure A is Q2 (respectively, Q3) we also say the corresponding
access structure AS = 2P −A is Q2 (respectively, Q3).
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2.1 Linear Secret Sharing Schemes and Monotone Span Programs
Suppose S is the secret-domain, R is the set of random inputs, and Si is the
share-domain of Pi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let S and R denote random variables
taking values in S and R, respectively. Then Π : S×R→ S1× · · ·×Sn is called
a secret sharing scheme (SSS) with respect to the access structure AS, if the
following two conditions are satisfied:
1. for all A ∈ AS, H(S | Π(S,R)|A) = 0;
2. for all B 6∈ AS, H(S | Π(S,R)|B) = H(S),
where H(·) is the entropy function. Furthermore, the secret sharing scheme Π is
called linear if we have S = K, R = Kl−1, and Si = Kdi for some positive integers
l and di, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and the reconstruction of the secret can be performed by
taking a linear combination of shares from the authorized players. The quantity
d =
∑n
i=1 di is called the size of the LSSS.
Karchmer and Wigderson [10] introduced monotone span programs (MSP)
as a linear model for computing monotone Boolean functions. We denote an
MSP by M(K,M, ψ,v), where M is a d × l matrix over K, ψ : {1, . . . , d} →
{P1, . . . , Pn} is a surjective labeling map, and v ∈ K
l is a nonzero vector. We
call d the size of the MSP and v the target vector. A monotone Boolean function
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} satisfies f(δ′) ≥ f(δ) for any δ′ ≥ δ, where δ = (δ1, . . . , δn),
δ′ = (δ′1, . . . , δ
′
n) ∈ {0, 1}
n, and δ′ ≥ δ means δ′i ≥ δi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We
say that an MSP M(K,M, ψ,v) computes the monotone Boolean function f if
v ∈ span{MA} if and only if f(δA) = 1, where A is a set of players,MA denotes
the matrix constricted to the rows labeled by players in A, span{MA} denotes
the linear space spanned by the row vectors of MA, and δA is the characteristic
vector of A.
Theorem 1 (Beimel [2]). Suppose AS is an access structure over P and fAS
is the characteristic function of AS, that is, fAS(δ) = 1 if and only if δ = δA
for some A ∈ AS. Then there exists an LSSS of size d that realizes AS if and
only if there exists an MSP of size d that computes fAS.
Since an MSP computes the same Boolean function under linear transforma-
tions, we can always assume that the target vector is e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0). From
an MSP M(K,M, ψ, e1) that computes fAS , we can derive an LSSS realizing
AS as follows: to share a secret s ∈ K, the dealer randomly selects ρ ∈ Kl−1,
computesM(s,ρ)τ and sendsMPi(s,ρ)
τ to Pi as his share, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
τ denotes the transpose. The following property of MSP is useful in the proofs
of our results.
Proposition 1 (Karchmer and Wigderson [10]). Let M(K,M, ψ, e1) be
an MSP that computes a monotone Boolean function f . Then for all A ⊆ P ,
e1 6∈ span{MA} if and only if there exists ρ ∈ K
l−1 such that MA(1,ρ)
τ = 0τ .
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2.2 Multiplicative Linear Secret Sharing Schemes
From Theorem 1, an LSSS can be identified with its corresponding MSP in the
following way. LetM(K,M, ψ, e1) be an LSSS realizing the access structure AS.
Given two vectors x = (x1, . . . , xd), y = (y1, . . . , yd) ∈ Kd, we define x ⋄ y to
be the vector containing all entries of the form xi · yj with ψ(i) = ψ(j). More
precisely, let
x = (x11, . . . , x1d1 , . . . , xn1, . . . , xndn),
y = (y11, . . . , y1d1, . . . , yn1, . . . , yndn),
where
∑n
i=1 di = d, and (xi1, . . . , xidi), (yi1, . . . , yidi) are the entries distributed
to Pi according to ψ. Then x ⋄ y is the vector composed of the
∑n
i=1 d
2
i entries
xijyik, where 1 ≤ j, k ≤ di, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For consistency, we write the entries of
x ⋄ y in some fixed order. We also define (x ⋄ y)τ = xτ ⋄ yτ .
Definition 1 (Multiplicativity). Let M(K,M, ψ, e1) be an LSSS realizing
the access structure AS over P . Then M is called multiplicative if there exists a
recombination vector z ∈ K
P
n
i=1
d2
i , such that for all s, s′ ∈ K and ρ,ρ′ ∈ Kl−1,
we have
ss′ = z(M(s,ρ)τ ⋄M(s′,ρ′)τ ).
Moreover, M is strongly multiplicative if for all A ∈ A = 2P − AS, MA is
multiplicative, where MA denotes the MSP M constricted to the subset A =
P −A.
Proposition 2 (Cramer et al. [6]). Let AS be an access structure over P .
Then there exists a multiplicative (respectively, strongly multiplicative) LSSS re-
alizing AS if and only if AS is Q2 (respectively, Q3).
2.3 General Constructions of Strongly Multiplicative LSSS
For all Q2 access structure AS, Cramer et al. [6] gave an efficient construction
to build a multiplicative LSSS from a general LSSS realizing the same AS. It
remains open if we can efficiently construct a strongly multiplicative LSSS from
an LSSS. However, there are general constructions with exponential complexity,
as described below.
Since Shamir’s threshold secret sharing scheme is strongly multiplicative for
all Q3 threshold access structure, a proper composition of Shamir’s threshold
secret sharing schemes results in a general construction for strongly multiplica-
tive LSSS [6]. Here, we give another general construction based on multiplicative
LSSS.
Let AS be any Q3 access structure andM(K,M, ψ, e1) be an LSSS realizing
AS. For all A ∈ A = 2P − AS, it is easy to see that MA realizes the restricted
access structure ASA = {B ⊆ A | B ∈ AS}. The access structure ASA is
Q2 over A because AS is Q3 over A ∪ A. Thus, we can transform MA into a
multiplicative LSSS following the general construction of Cramer et al. [6] to
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obtain a strongly multiplicative LSSS realizing AS. The example in Section 4.3
gives an illustration of this method.
We note that both constructions above give LSSS of exponential sizes, and
hence are not efficient in general.
3 3-Multiplicative and λ-Multiplicative LSSS
In this section, we give an equivalent definition for (strongly) multiplicative
LSSS. We then define 3-multiplicative LSSS and give a necessary and sufficient
condition for its existence. The notion of 3-multiplicativity is also extended to λ-
multiplicativity for all integer λ > 1. Finally, we present a generic (but inefficient)
construction of λ-multiplicative LSSS.
Under the same notations used in Section 2.2, it is straightforward to see
that we have an induced labeling map ψ′ : {1, . . . ,
∑n
i=1 d
2
i } → {P1, . . . , Pn} on
the entries of x⋄y, distributing the entry xijyik to Pi, since both xij and yik are
labeled by Pi under ψ. For an MSP M(K,M, ψ, e1), denote M = (M1, . . . ,Ml),
where Mi ∈ Kd is the i-th column vector of M , 1 ≤ i ≤ l. We construct a new
matrix M⋄ as follows:
M⋄ = (M1 ⋄M1, . . . ,M1 ⋄Ml,M2 ⋄M1, . . . ,M2 ⋄Ml, . . . ,Ml ⋄M1, . . . ,Ml ⋄Ml).
For consistency, we also denote M⋄ as M ⋄M . Obviously, M⋄ is a matrix over
K with
∑n
i=1 d
2
i rows and l
2 columns. For any two vectors u,v ∈ Kl, it is easy
to verify that
(Muτ ) ⋄ (Mvτ ) =M⋄(u ⊗ v)
τ ,
where u⊗v denotes the tensor product with its entries written in a proper order.
Define the induced labeling map ψ′ on the rows of M⋄. We have the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. Let M(K,M, ψ, e1) be an LSSS realizing the access structure
AS, and let M⋄ be with the labeling map ψ
′. Then M is multiplicative if and
only if e1 ∈ span{M⋄}, where e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0). Moreover, M is strongly mul-
tiplicative if and only if e1 ∈ span{(M⋄)A} for all A ∈ A = 2
P −AS.
Proof. By Definition 1, M is multiplicative if and only if ss′ = z(M(s,ρ)τ ⋄
M(s′,ρ′)τ ) for all s, s′ ∈ K and ρ,ρ′ ∈ Kl−1. Obviously,
M(s,ρ)τ ⋄M(s′,ρ′)τ =M⋄((s,ρ)⊗ (s
′,ρ′))τ =M⋄(ss
′,ρ′′)τ , (1)
where (ss′,ρ′′) = (s,ρ) ⊗ (s′,ρ′). On the other hand, ss′ = e1(ss
′,ρ′′)τ . Thus
M is multiplicative if and only if
(e1 − zM⋄)(ss
′,ρ′′)τ = 0. (2)
Because of the arbitrariness of s, s′,ρ and ρ′, equality (2) holds if and only if
e1 − zM⋄ = 0. Thus e1 ∈ span{M⋄}. The latter part of the proposition can be
proved similarly. 
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Now we are ready to give the definition of 3-multiplicative LSSS. We extend
the diamond product “⋄” and define x ⋄ y ⋄ z to be the vector containing all
entries of the form xiyjzk with ψ(i) = ψ(j) = ψ(k), where the entries of x⋄y ⋄z
are written in some fixed order.
Definition 2 (3-Multiplicativity). Let M(K,M, ψ, e1) be an LSSS realiz-
ing the access structure AS. Then M is called 3-multiplicative if there ex-
ists a recombination vector z ∈ K
P
n
i=1
d3
i such that for all s1, s2, s3 ∈ K and
ρ1,ρ2,ρ3 ∈ Kl−1, we have
s1s2s3 = z(M(s1,ρ1)
τ ⋄M(s2,ρ2)
τ ⋄M(s3,ρ3)
τ ).
We can derive an equivalent definition for 3-multiplicative LSSS, similar to
Proposition 3:M is 3-multiplicative if and only if e1 ∈ span{(M ⋄M ⋄M)}. The
following proposition gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence
of 3-multiplicative LSSS.
Proposition 4. For all access structures AS, there exists a 3-multiplicative
LSSS realizing AS if and only if AS is Q3.
Proof. Suppose M(K,M, ψ, e1) is a 3-multiplicative LSSS realizing AS, and
suppose to the contrary, that AS is not Q3, so there exist A1, A2, A3 ∈ A =
2P −AS such that A1 ∪ A2 ∪A3 = P . By Proposition 1, there exists ρi ∈ Kl−1
such that MAi(1,ρi)
τ = 0τ for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. Since A1 ∪ A2 ∪ A3 = P , we have
M(1,ρ1)
τ ⋄M(1,ρ2)τ ⋄M(1,ρ3)τ = 0τ , which contradicts Definition 2.
On the other hand, a general construction for building a 3-multiplicative
LSSS from a strongly multiplicative LSSS is given in the next section, thus
sufficiency is guaranteed by Proposition 2. 
A trivial example of 3-multiplicative LSSS is Shamir’s threshold secret shar-
ing scheme that realizes any Q3 threshold access structure. Using an identical
argument for the case of strongly multiplicative LSSS, we have a general con-
struction for 3-multiplicative LSSS based on Shamir’s threshold secret sharing
schemes, with exponential complexity.
For any λ vectors xi = (xi1, . . . , xid) ∈ Kd, 1 ≤ i ≤ λ, we define ⋄λi=1xi to
be the
∑n
i=1 d
λ
i -dimensional vector which contains entries of the form
∏λ
i=1 xiji
with ψ(j1) = · · · = ψ(jλ).
Definition 3 (λ-Multiplicativity). Let M(K,M, ψ, e1) be an LSSS realizing
the access structure AS, and let λ > 1 be an integer. Then M is λ-multiplicative
if there exists a recombination vector z such that for all s1, . . . , sλ ∈ K and
ρ1, . . . ,ρλ ∈ Kl−1, we have
λ∏
i=1
si = z(⋄
λ
i=1M(si,ρi)
τ ).
Moreover, M is strongly λ-multiplicative if for all A 6∈ AS, the constricted LSSS
MA is λ-multiplicative.
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Again, we can define a new matrix by taking the diamond product of λ
copies ofM . This gives an equivalence to (strongly) λ-multiplicative LSSS. Also,
since Shamir’s threshold secret sharing scheme is trivially λ-multiplicative and
strongly λ-multiplicative, a proper composition of Shamir’s threshold secret shar-
ing schemes results in a general construction for both λ-multiplicative LSSS and
strongly λ-multiplicative LSSS. Let Qλ be a straightforward extension of Q2 and
Q3, that is, an access structure AS is Qλ if the player set P cannot be covered
by λ sets in A = 2P −AS. The following corollary is easy to prove.
Corollary 1. Let AS be an access structure over P . Then there exists a λ-
multiplicative (respectively, strongly λ-multiplicative) LSSS realizing AS if and
only if AS is Qλ (respectively, Qλ+1).
Since a λ-multiplicative LSSS transforms the products of λ entries into a
linear combination of the local products of shares, it can be used to simplify the
secure computation of sequential multiplications. In particular, when compared
to using only the multiplicative property (which corresponds to the case when
λ = 2), a λ-multiplicative LSSS can lead to reduced round complexity by a factor
of 1log λ in certain cases.
We also point out that Qλ is not a necessary condition for secure compu-
tation. Instead, the necessary condition is Q2 for the passive adversary model,
or Q3 for the active adversary model [6]. The condition Qλ is just a neces-
sary condition for the existence of λ-multiplicative LSSS which can be used to
simplify computation. In practice, many threshold adversary structures satisfy
the Qλ condition for some appropriate integer λ, and the widely used Shamir’s
threshold secret sharing scheme is already λ-multiplicative. By using this λ-
multiplicativity, we can get more efficient MPC protocols. However, since the
special case λ = 3 shows a close relationship with strongly multiplicative LSSS,
a fundamental tool in MPC, this paper focuses on 3-multiplicative LSSS.
4 Strong Multiplicativity and 3-Multiplicativity
In this section, we show that strong multiplicativity and 3-multiplicativity are
closely related. On the one hand, given a strongly multiplicative LSSS, there is an
efficient transformation that converts it to a 3-multiplicative LSSS. On the other
hand, we show that any 3-multiplicative LSSS is a strongly multiplicative LSSS,
but the converse is not true. It should be noted that strong multiplicativity,
as defined, has a combinatorial nature. The definition of 3-multiplicativity is
essentially algebraic, which is typically easier to verify.
4.1 From Strong Multiplicativity to 3-Multiplicativity
We show a general method to efficiently build a 3-multiplicative LSSS from a
strongly multiplicative LSSS, for all Q3 access structures. As an extension, the
proposed method can also be used to efficiently build a (λ + 1)-multiplicative
LSSS from a strongly λ-multiplicative LSSS.
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Theorem 2. Let AS be a Q3 access structure and M(K,M, ψ, e1) be a strongly
multiplicative LSSS realizing AS. Suppose thatM has size d and |ψ−1(Pi)| = di,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then there exists a 3-multiplicative LSSS for AS of size O(d2).
Proof. We give a constructive proof. Let M⋄ be the matrix defined in Section 3,
and ψ′ be the induced labeling map on the rows of M⋄. Then we have an LSSS
M⋄(K,M⋄, ψ′, e1) that realizes an access structure AS⋄. BecauseM is strongly
multiplicative, by Proposition 3 we have e1 ∈ span{(M⋄)A} for all A 6∈ AS.
Therefore A ∈ AS⋄ and it follows that AS∗ ⊆ AS⋄, where AS∗ denotes the dual
access structure of AS, defined by AS∗ = {A ⊆ P | P −A 6∈ AS}.
The equality (1) in the proof of Proposition 3 shows that the diamond product
of two share vectors equals sharing the product of the two secrets by the MSP
M⋄(K,M⋄, ψ′, e1), that is,
(M(s1,ρ
′
1)
τ ) ⋄ (M(s2,ρ
′
2)
τ ) =M⋄(s1s2,ρ)
τ , for some ρ′1,ρ
′
2,ρ ∈ K
l−1.
Thus, using a method similar to Nikov et al. [14], we can get the product (s1s2)·s3
by sharing s3 through the dual MSP of M⋄, denoted by (M⋄)
∗. Furthermore,
since (M⋄)∗ realizes the dual access structure (AS⋄)∗ and (AS⋄)∗ ⊆ (AS∗)∗ =
AS, we can build a 3-multiplicative LSSS by the union ofM and (M⋄)∗, which
realizes the access structure AS∪(AS⋄)∗ = AS. Now following the same method
of Cramer et al. and Fehr [6, 8], we prove the required result via the construction
below.
Compute the column vector v0 as a solution to the equation (M⋄)
τv = e1
τ
for v, and compute v1, . . . ,vk as a basis of the solution space to (M⋄)
τv = 0τ .
Note that (M⋄)
τv = e1
τ is solvable because e1 ∈ span{(M⋄)A} for all A 6∈ AS,
while (M⋄)
τv = 0τ may only have the trivial solution v = 0 and k = 0. Let
M ′ =


m11 · · · m1l
...
. . .
...
md1 · · · mdl
v0 v1 · · · vk

 ,
where


m11 · · · m1l
...
. . .
...
md1 · · · mdl

 =M and the blanks inM ′ denote zeros. Define a labeling
map ψ′′ on the rows of M ′ which labels the first d rows of M ′ according to ψ
and the other
∑n
i=1 d
2
i rows according to ψ
′.
As mentioned above, M′(K,M ′, ψ′′, e1) obviously realizes the access struc-
ture AS. We now verify its 3-multiplicativity.
Let N = (v0,v1, . . . ,vk), a matrix over K with
∑n
i=1 d
2
i rows and k + 1
columns. For si ∈ K and ρi = (ρ′i,ρ
′′
i ) ∈ K
l−1 × Kk, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, denote
M ′(si,ρi)
τ = (ui,wi)
τ , where u τi = M(si,ρ
′
i)
τ and w τi = N(si,ρ
′′
i )
τ . We
have
u τ1 ⋄ u
τ
2 = (M(s1,ρ
′
1)
τ ) ⋄ (M(s2,ρ
′
2)
τ ) =M⋄(s1s2,ρ)
τ ,
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where (s1s2,ρ) = (s1,ρ
′
1)⊗ (s2,ρ
′
2). Then,
(u1 ⋄ u2) ·w
τ
3 = (s1s2,ρ)(M⋄)
τ ·N

 s3
ρ′′3
τ


= (s1s2,ρ)


1 0 · · · 0
0 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 0



 s3
ρ′′3
τ


= s1s2s3.
It is easy to see that (u1 ⋄u2) ·w τ3 is a linear combination of the entries from
(u1 ⋄ u2) ⋄w3, and so is a linear combination of the entries from M ′(s1,ρ1)τ ⋄
M ′(s2,ρ2)
τ ⋄M ′(s3,ρ3)τ .
Hence M′ is a 3-multiplicative LSSS for AS. Obviously, the size of M′ is
O(d2), since d+
∑n
i=1 d
2
i < d
2 + d. 
If we replace the matrix M⋄ above by the diamond product of λ copies of
M , using an identical argument, the construction from Theorem 2 gives rise to
a (λ+ 1)-multiplicative LSSS from a strongly λ-multiplicative LSSS.
Corollary 2. Let AS be a Qλ+1 access structure and M(K,M, ψ, e1) be a
strongly λ-multiplicative LSSS realizing AS. Suppose the size of M is d and
|ψ−1(Pi)| = di, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then there exists a (λ + 1)-multiplicative LSSS
for AS of size O(dλ).
4.2 From 3-Multiplicativity to Strong Multiplicativity
Theorem 3. Any 3-multiplicative LSSS is strongly multiplicative.
Proof. LetM(K,M, ψ, e1) be a 3-multiplicative LSSS realizing the access struc-
ture AS over P . For all A ∈ A = 2P − AS, by Proposition 1, we can choose a
fixed vector ρ′′ ∈ Kl−1 such thatMA(1,ρ
′′)τ = 0τ . There exists a recombination
vector z ∈ K
P
n
i=1
d3
i such that for all s, s′ ∈ K and ρ,ρ′ ∈ Kl−1, we have
ss′ = z(M(s,ρ)τ ⋄M(s′,ρ′)τ ⋄M(1,ρ′′)τ ).
Since MA(1,ρ
′′)τ = 0τ , and MA(1,ρ
′′)τ is a constant vector for fixed ρ′′, the
vector z′ ∈ K
P
Pi 6∈A
d2
i that satisfies
z(M(s,ρ)τ ⋄M(s′,ρ′)τ ⋄M(1,ρ′′)τ ) = z′(MA(s,ρ)
τ ⋄MA(s
′,ρ′)τ )
can be easily determined. Thus ss′ = z′(MA(s,ρ)
τ ⋄MA(s
′,ρ′)τ ). Hence, M is
strongly multiplicative. 
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Although 3-multiplicative LSSS is a subclass of strongly multiplicative LSSS,
one of the advantages of 3-multiplicativity is that its verification admits a simpler
process. For 3-multiplicativity, we need only to check that e1 ∈ span{(M ⋄M ⋄
M)}, while strong multiplicativity requires the verification of e1 ∈ span{(M ⋄
M)A} for all A 6∈ AS.
Using a similar argument, the following results for (λ + 1)-multiplicativity
can be proved:
(i) A (λ+ 1)-multiplicative LSSS is a strongly λ-multiplicative LSSS.
(ii) A λ-multiplicative LSSS is a λ′-multiplicative LSSS, where 1 < λ′ < λ.
4.3 An Example of a Strongly Multiplicative LSSS that is Not
3-Multiplicative
We give an example of a strongly multiplicative LSSS that is not 3-multiplicative.
It follows that 3-multiplicative LSSS are strictly contained in the class of strongly
multiplicative LSSS. The construction process is as follows. Start with an LSSS
that realizes a Q3 access structure but is not strongly multiplicative. We then
apply the general construction given in Section 2.3 to convert it into a strongly
multiplicative LSSS. The resulting LSSS is however not 3-multiplicative.
Let P = {P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6} be the set of players. Consider the access
structure AS over P defined by
ASmin = {(1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 6), (1, 5), (1, 6), (2, 6), (2, 5), (3, 6), (4, 5)},
where we use subscript to denote the corresponding player. For example, (1, 2)
denotes the subset {P1, P2}. It is easy to verify that the corresponding adversary
structure is
Amax = {(1, 3), (1, 4), (2, 3), (2, 4), (3, 5), (4, 6)},
and that AS is a Q3 access structure.
Let K = F2. Define the matrix M over F2 with the labeling map ψ such that
MP1 =

1 0 1 0 00 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1

 , MP2 =

0 0 1 0 00 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1

 , MP3 =
(
1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
)
,
MP4 =
(
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
)
, MP5 =
(
1 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0
)
, MP6 =
(
0 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1
)
.
It can be verified that the LSSS M(F2,M, ψ, e1) realizes the access structure
AS. Moreover, for all A ∈ A − {(1, 3), (1, 4)}, the constricted LSSS MA is
multiplicative. Thus in order to get a strongly multiplicative LSSS, we just need
to expandM with multiplicativity when constricted to both {P2, P4, P5, P6} and
{P2, P3, P5, P6}.
Firstly, consider the LSSSM constricted to P ′ = {P2, P4, P5, P6}. Obviously,
MP ′ realizes the access structure AS′min = {(5, 6), (2, 6), (2, 5), (4, 5)}, which is
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Q2 over P ′. By the method of Cramer et al. [6], we can transformMP ′ into the
multiplicative LSSS M′P ′(F2,M
′, ψ′, e1) defined as follows:
M ′P2 =


0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1


, M ′P4 =


0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 0 0

 ,
M ′P5 =


1 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 0

 , M ′P6 =


0 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1

 ,
where the blanks in the matrices denote zeros.
For consistency, we define
M ′P1 = (MP1 O3×4),
M ′P3 = (MP3 O2×4),
where Om×n denotes the m×n matrix of all zeros. It can be verified that for the
subset P ′′ = {P2, P3, P5, P6}, the constricted LSSSM′P ′′ is indeed multiplicative.
Therefore, M′(F2,M ′, ψ′, e1) is a strongly multiplicative LSSS realizing the ac-
cess structure AS. Furthermore, it can be verified thatM′ is not 3-multiplicative
(the verification involves checking a 443× 729 matrix using Matlab).
The scheme M(F2,M, ψ,v1) given above is the first example of an LSSS
which realizes a Q3 access structure but is not strongly multiplicative.
5 Constructions for 3-multiplicative LSSS
It is tempting to find efficient constructions for 3-multiplicative LSSS. In general,
it is a hard problem to construct LSSS with polynomial size for any specified
access structure, and it seems to be an even harder problem to construct polyno-
mial size 3-multiplicative LSSS with general Q3 access structures. We mention
two constructions for 3-multiplicative LSSS. These constructions are generally
inefficient, which can result in schemes with exponential sizes. The two construc-
tions are:
1. The Cramer-Damg˚ard-Maurer construction based on Shamir’s threshold se-
cret sharing scheme [6].
2. The construction given in Subsection 4.1 based on strongly multiplicative
LSSS.
There exist, however, some efficient LSSS with specific access structures that
are multiplicative or 3-multiplicative. For instance, Shamir’s t out of n threshold
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secret sharing schemes are multiplicative if n ≥ 2t + 1, and 3-multiplicative if
n ≥ 3t+ 1.
On the other hand, secret sharing schemes from error-correcting codes give
good multiplicative properties. It is well known that a secret sharing scheme
from a linear error-correcting code is an LSSS. We know that such an LSSS is
multiplicative provided the underlying code is a self dual code [7]. The LSSS from
a Reed-Solomon code is λ-multiplicative if the corresponding access structure is
Qλ. In this section, we show the multiplicativity of two other classes of secret
sharing schemes from error-correcting codes:
(i) schemes from Reed-Muller codes are λ-multiplicative LSSS; and
(ii) schemes from algebraic geometric codes are λ-multiplicative ramp LSSS.
5.1 A Construction from Reed-Muller Codes
Let v0,v1, . . . ,v2m−1 be all the points in the space F
m
2 . The binary Reed-Muller
code R(r,m) is defined as follows:
R(r,m) = {(f(v0), f(v1), . . . , f(v2m−1)) | f ∈ F2[x1, . . . , xm], deg f ≤ r}.
Take f(v0) as the secret, and f(vi) as the share distributed to player Pi,
1 ≤ i ≤ 2m − 1. Then R(r,m) gives rise to an LSSS for the set of players
{P1, . . . , Pn}, with the secret-domain being F2, where n = 2m− 1. For any three
codewords
ci = (si, si1, . . . , sin) = (fi(v0), fi(v1), . . . , fi(vn)) ∈ R(r,m), 1 ≤ i ≤ 3,
it is easy to see that
c1 ⋄ c2 ⋄ c3 = (s1s2s3, s11s21s31, . . . , s1ns2ns3n)
= (g(v0), g(v1), . . . , g(vn)) ∈ R(3r,m),
where g = f1f2f3 ∈ F2[x1, . . . , xm] and deg g ≤ 3r. From basic results on Reed-
Muller codes [15], we know that R(3r,m) has dual code R(m− 3r− 1,m) when
m > 3r, and the dual code R(m − 3r − 1,m) trivially contains the codeword
(1, 1, . . . , 1). It follows that s1s2s3 =
∑n
j=1 s1js2js3j , which shows that the LSSS
from R(r,m) is 3-multiplicative when m > 3r. Certainly, this LSSS is strongly
multiplicative. In general, we have the following result:
Theorem 4. The LSSS constructed above from R(r,m) is λ-multiplicative, pro-
vided m > λr.
5.2 A Construction from Algebraic Geometric Codes
Chen and Cramer [3] constructed secret sharing schemes from algebraic geo-
metric (AG) codes. These schemes are quasi-threshold (or ramp) schemes, which
means that any t out of n players can recover the secret, and any fewer than
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t′ players have no information about the secret, where t′ ≤ t ≤ n. In this sec-
tion, we show that ramp schemes from some algebraic geometric codes [3] are
λ-multiplicative.
Let χ be an absolutely irreducible, projective, and nonsingular curve defined
over Fq with genus g, and let D = {v0, v1, . . . , vn} be the set of Fq-rational points
on χ. Let G be an Fq-rational divisor with degree m satisfying supp(G)∩D = ∅
and 2g − 2 < m < n + 1. Let Fq denote the algebraic closure of Fq, let Fq(χ)
denote the function field of the curve χ, and let Ω(χ) denote all the differentials
on χ. Define the linear spaces:
L(G) = {f ∈ Fq(χ) | (f) +G ≥ 0},
Ω(G) = {ω ∈ Ω(χ) | (ω) ≥ G}.
Then the functional AG code CL(D,G) and residual AG code CΩ(D,G) are
respectively defined as follows:
CL(D,G) = {(f(v0), f(v1), . . . , f(vn)) | f ∈ L(G)} ⊆ F
n+1
q ,
CΩ(D,G) = {(Resv0(η), Resv1(η), . . . , Resvn(η)) | η ∈ Ω(G−D)} ⊆ F
n+1
q ,
where Resvi(η) denotes the residue of η at vi.
As above, CΩ(D,G) induces an LSSS for the set of players {P1, . . . , Pn},
where for every codeword (f(v0), f(v1), . . . , f(vn)) ∈ CΩ(D,G) = CL(D,D −
G + (η)), f(v0) is the secret and f(vi) is Pi’s share, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For any λ
codewords
ci = (si, si1, . . . , sin)
= (fi(v0), fi(v1), . . . , fi(vn)) ∈ CL(D,D −G+ (η)), 1 ≤ i ≤ λ,
it is easy to see that
⋄λi=1ci =
(
λ∏
i=1
si,
λ∏
i=1
si1, . . . ,
λ∏
i=1
sin
)
∈ CL(D,λ(D −G+ (η))).
If 2g − 2 < deg(λ(D − G + (η))) < n, then CL(D,λ(D − G + (η))) has
the dual code CΩ(D,λ(D −G + (η))) = CL(D,λG − (λ − 1)(D + (η))). When
deg(λG − (λ − 1)(D + (η))) ≥ 2g, CΩ(D,λ(D − G + (η))) has a codeword
with a nonzero first coordinate, implying
∏λ
i=1 si =
∑n
j=1 aj
∏λ
i=1 sij for some
constants aj ∈ Fq. Thus, the LSSS induced by the AG code CΩ(D,G) is λ-
multiplicative. It is easy to see that if degG = m ≥ (λ−1)(n−1)
λ
+ 2g then we
have 2g − 2 < deg(λ(D −G + (η))) < n and deg(λG − (λ − 1)(D + (η))) ≥ 2g.
Therefore, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Let χ be an absolutely irreducible, projective, and nonsingular
curve defined over Fq with genus g, let D = {v0, v1, . . . , vn} be the set of Fq-
rational points on χ. Let G be an Fq-rational divisor with degree m satisfying
supp(G) ∩ D = ∅ and 2g − 2 < m < n + 1. Then the LSSS induced by the AG
code CΩ(D,G) is λ-multiplicative, provided m ≥
(λ−1)(n−1)
λ
+ 2g.
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6 Implications of the Multiplicativity of LSSS
The property of 3-multiplicativity implies strong multiplicativity, and so is suf-
ficient for building MPC protocols against active adversaries. The conditions for
3-multiplicativity are easy to verify, while verification for strong multiplicativ-
ity involves checking an exponential number of equations (each subset in the
adversary structure corresponds to an equation).
With 3-multiplicative LSSS, or more generally λ-multiplicative LSSS, we can
simplify local computation for each player and reduce the round complexity in
MPC protocols. For example, using the technique of Bar-Ilan and Beaver [1],
we can compute
∏l
i=1 xi, xi ∈ Fq, in a constant number of rounds, independent
of l. For simplicity, we consider passive adversaries in the information-theoretic
model. Suppose for 1 ≤ i ≤ l, the shares of xi, denoted by [xi], have already
been distributed among the players. To compute
∏l
i=1 xi, xi ∈ Fq, we follow the
process of Cramer et al. [4]:
(1) Generate [b0 ∈R F ∗q ], [b1 ∈R F
∗
q ], . . . , [bl ∈R F
∗
q ] and [b
−1
0 ], [b
−1
1 ], . . . , [b
−1
l ],
where bi ∈R F ∗q means that bi is a random element in F
∗
q .
(2) For 1 ≤ i ≤ l, each player computes [bi−1xib
−1
i ] from [bi−1], [b
−1
i ] and [xi].
(3) Recover di = bi−1xib
−1
i from [bi−1xib
−1
i ] for 1 ≤ i ≤ l, and compute d =∏l
i=1 di.
(4) Compute [db−10 bl] from [b
−1
0 ], [bl] and d.
It is easy to see that db−10 bl =
∏l
i=1 xi. Using a strongly multiplicative LSSS,
the above process takes five rounds of interactions as two rounds are required in
Step (2). However, if we use a 3-multiplicative LSSS instead, then only one round
is needed for Step (2). Thus, 3-multiplicative LSSS reduce the round complexity
of computing unbounded fan-in multiplication from five to four. This in turn
simplifies the computation of many problems, such as polynomial evaluation
and solving linear systems of equations.
In general, the relationship between λ-multiplicative LSSS and strongly λ-
multiplicative LSSS can be described as follows:
· · · ⊆ SMLSSSλ+1 (MLSSSλ+1 ⊆ SMLSSSλ (MLSSSλ ⊆ · · · ,
where MLSSSλ (respectively, SMLSSSλ) denotes the class of λ-multiplicative
(respectively, strongly λ-multiplicative) LSSS. It is easy to see that SMLSSSλ (
MLSSSλ because they exist under the conditions Q
λ+1 and Qλ, respectively.
Since SMLSSSλ and MLSSSλ+1 both exist under the same necessary and
sufficient condition of Qλ+1, it is not straightforward to see whetherMLSSSλ+1
is strictly contained in SMLSSSλ. For λ = 2, we already know thatMLSSS3 (
SMLSSS2 (Section 4.3). It would be interesting to find out if this is also true
for λ > 2. We have also given an efficient transformation from SMLSSSλ to
MLSSSλ+1. It remains open whether an efficient transformation fromMLSSSλ
to SMLSSSλ exists when the access structure is Q
λ+1. When λ = 2, this is a
well-known open problem [6].
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7 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose the new concept of 3-multiplicative LSSS, which form a
subclass of strongly multiplicative LSSS. The 3-multiplicative LSSS are easier to
construct compared to strongly multiplicative LSSS. They can also simplify the
computation and reduce the round complexity in secure multiparty computation
protocols. We believe that 3-multiplicative LSSS are a more appropriate primi-
tive as building blocks for secure multiparty computations, and deserve further
investigation. We stress that finding efficient constructions of 3-multiplicative
LSSS for general access structures remains an important open problem.
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